This is the first large-scale study to examine the peer companies used by sell-side equity analysts in their research reports. Using a unique hand-collected data set, we investigate the manner in which analysts choose peer companies as well as the relation between peer valuation and peer choice by analysts. We first show that analysts are more likely to choose peer firms that are similar in size, leverage, asset turnover, industry classification, and trading volume, to the firm they are recommending. However, controlling for those firm characteristics, we find that analysts on average select peer companies with high valuations, consistent with analysts choosing peers strategically. We further find that this effect varies systematically with analysts' reputation, analysts' incentives, and expected firm growth. We also find partial support for the idea that the selection of peers with high valuations helps explain the widely documented optimistic bias in stock recommendations.
Introduction
This is the first study to systematically examine sell-side equity analysts' choice of peers in a large sample. Analysts are sophisticated users of financial statement information who provide, among other things, earnings estimates, valuations (including target prices), and stock recommendations for the firms they cover. These analysts often use peers in their research to compare performance and valuations across firms as well as to estimate the valuation of the firms they cover. Moreover, analysts' within-industry comparisons comprise a large part of their value-added (Boni and Womack 2006) .
Financial analysis textbooks commonly recommend the use of peers. Yet, there is little theory to guide the choice of peers in valuation and performance comparisons. While empirical researchers have studied which multiples best explain stock price as well as how to choose peers (Boatsman and Baskin 1981; Alford 1992; Bhojraj and Lee 2002; Thomas 2002, 2007) , the extant literature has not yet examined how peers are chosen in practice.
We hand-collect analysts' reports from Thomson Investext and manually extract the information on peer firms from the reports. Using this unique data set, we are able to observe and examine the peers used by analysts in their research reports. In cross-sectional analyses, we first show that analysts are more likely to choose peers that are similar in size, leverage, asset turnover, industry classification, and trading volume, to the firm they are recommending.
Documenting how analysts choose peer firms in practice is new to the literature.
Next, we consider the relation between peer valuation and peer choice by analysts. If an analyst is induced to estimate a high valuation for a firm she covers, one possible strategy would be to choose peer companies with high valuation multiples so as to make the firm in question appear relatively undervalued. We test for this effect using four valuation multiples: earnings to price, book to price, sales to enterprise value, and EBITDA to enterprise value. Controlling for the above firm characteristics, we show that analysts tend to select peers with higher valuations, consistent with analysts choosing peers in an optimistic manner. In addition to being a novel finding by itself, this result could potentially explain (or at least contribute to explaining the mechanisms for) findings in the extant analyst literature, such as optimistically-biased stock recommendations.
We further examine whether the relation between peer valuation and peer choice varies systematically with analyst and firm factors. Specifically, we focus on analyst reputation, analyst incentives, and expected firm growth. Previous research suggests that analysts who are ranked by
Institutional Investor Magazine (II-ranked analysts) exhibit superior performance in a variety of settings. We find that the relation between peer valuation and peer choice is reduced (and in fact disappears for three of the four valuation multiples we consider) for II-ranked analysts, suggesting that higher analyst skill significantly reduces the optimistic bias in peer selection.
Second, we investigate whether the relation between peer valuation and peer choice is increasing in analyst incentives. Indeed, we find that this is the case; our results indicate that the bias is larger for firms with greater external financing needs, suggesting analysts choose peers strategically to increase the chances of attracting investment banking business. Finally, prior research, such as Bradshaw (2004) and Thomas (2009, 2010) , suggests that analysts tend to overemphasize firms' growth opportunities. Consistent with this idea, we find that the relation between peer valuation and peer choice increases in firms' expected growth. We further provide some evidence supporting the idea that the bias in peer choice partially explains some of the well-documented optimistic bias in stock recommendations.
While the literature normally considers analysts as sophisticated financial information intermediaries with significant firm-specific knowledge, given that our empirical evidence suggests that there is an optimistic bias in analysts' peer selection, it is an empirical question whether the manner in which peers are chosen by analysts is helpful in forecasting firm fundamentals. Thus, although our primary interest in this study is to examine how analysts choose their peers, as additional analyses we also test whether a peer prediction model based upon how sell-side analysts choose peers in practice has incremental ability to forecast future firm valuation multiples. Specifically, using the Bhojraj and Lee (2002) model of peer choice as a benchmark, we find that the peers predicted by our analyst model have additional explanatory power. In other words, using the peer prediction model in this paper improves upon the Bhojraj and Lee model, suggesting the usefulness of analysts in predicting peers for relative valuation.
Our research, which benefits from being the first to employ a comprehensive data set of the comparables actually used by sell-side analysts in their research reports, offers a unique contribution to the literature. Our study responds to Bradshaw's (2011) The next section reviews the relevant literature and develops our research questions.
Sections 3 and 4 present the research design and sample selection, respectively. Section 5 discusses the main empirical findings and corroborative findings. Section 6 concludes the article.
Background and Research Questions

Brief Background on Peer Firms in Equity Valuation
Financial analysis textbooks commonly recommend the use of peer firms in valuation (Healy and Palepu 2007; Stickney, Brown, and Wahlen 2007; Damodaran 2009 ). Valuing firms using multiples of their financial or operating drivers is a simple and popular approach to valuation (e.g., Baker and Ruback 1999; Imam, Barker, and Clubb 2008; Block 2010) . Using multiples to estimate a firm's value assumes the firm should be valued by capitalizing earnings (or cash flows, or sales, or some other metric) at a given price-earnings (or price-cash flow, enterprise value-sales, or other) multiple, such as the mean or median multiple for a set of comparable firms. Unlike the discounted cash flow and residual income valuation approaches, the use of multiples (at least seemingly) avoids the problems of estimating the required return (i.e., the discount rate or cost of capital) and of forecasting terminal values. However, implementing a multiples approach has its challenges. As Baker and Ruback (1999) outline, these challenges include choosing the appropriate value driver (i.e., cash flow or earnings or otherwise), choosing the peers against which to compare the firm, and measuring the peer multiple associated with these peers.
There is little theory to guide the selection and use of peers in valuation and performance comparisons. Empirical researchers have considered which multiples best explain stock price, as well as how to choose peer firms. Liu, Nissim, and Thomas (2002; 2007) compare the performance of numerous value drivers (forward earnings, historical earnings, cash flows, book value, and sales) and find that multiples derived from forward earnings best explain stock price. Boatsman and Baskin (1981) test the price-to-earnings (P/E) valuation method using as a firm's peer each of a random firm from the same industry, and the firm from the same industry with the most similar earnings growth rate. They conclude that the second approach is more accurate. In a study of P/E multiples, Alford (1992) finds that comparable firms from the same industry or with similar risk and earnings growth outperform comparable firms chosen from the broader market or with similar size or analyst long-term growth forecasts. Kim and Ritter (1999) and Roosenboom (2007) investigate the use of multiples by underwriters for firms undergoing initial public offerings. 3 Bhojraj and Lee (2002) argue that the choice of comparable firms used should be a function of the variables that drive cross-sectional variation in a given valuation multiple and demonstrate the efficacy of their approach. (In additional analyses below we compare their model to our analyst-based peer choice model.)
How Are Peer Firms Selected?
The initial focus of our study is how peers are chosen in practice by sell-side equity analysts. To the best of our knowledge, no prior large-scale empirical evidence exists on this issue. As Litov, Moreton, and Zenger (2012) argue, analysts make substantial investments in understanding complementarities within groups of similar firms. Litov et al. note that, the more unusual the strategy relative to peer companies in an industry, the less coverage the firm receives by analysts. We are motivated by these observations as well as by arguments in widely used financial statement analysis texts and well-cited academic studies in picking variables to construct our set of economic factors. Thus, although we acknowledge that there is limited theory to guide the empirical analyses, our approach is grounded in extant research. Generally speaking, we consider comparable firms to be those firms in the same industry that have similar size, similar accounting return drivers, and similar share characteristics (see Section 3 for details). To the extent that the explanatory variables load as predicted, and to the extent that the model has explanatory power for analysts' actual selection of peer firms, we consider analysts to be making peer choices guided by economic factors.
Potential Effect of Bias in Peer Selection
Although we expect analysts to pick peer firms based on attributes described in financial statement analysis texts and elsewhere, we know from the literature that analysts have incentives other than to merely maximize investor wealth. (Bradshaw (2011) provides an overview of the literature on biased analysts.) In other words, given the discretion in peer selection, there is a potential for analysts to choose peers in a biased manner. Specifically, if, based on her incentives the analyst wants to recommend that investors "buy" a stock, one way to justify the higher value would be to strategically pick peer firms with high valuations. However, as there are incentives for analysts to also be accurate, it is an empirical question whether analysts on average choose peers with higher valuations.
Conditional Analyses to Explore Variation in Bias (if any)
Given that the literature suggests there are both costs as well as benefits to being optimistic, we expect optimistic bias to be more prevalent in certain contexts. In the following, we explore the effects of analyst ability, analyst incentives, and expected firm growth.
Effects of Analyst Ability
We are interested in examining whether "high-ability" analysts, defined to include those analysts who are ranked by Institutional Investor (II) magazine, exhibit less bias than other analysts. This ranking is a first-order determinant of an analyst's compensation (Groysberg, Healy, and Maber 2011) . Extant research suggests that II-ranked analysts exhibit higher ability as evidenced through their greater forecasting accuracy, stock recommendation profitability, and report readability (e.g., Stickel 1990 Stickel , 1992 Gleason and Lee 2003; De Franco, Hope, Vyas, and Zhang 2012) . 4 We further expect that institutional investors demand less biased (or more neutral)
advice. 5 Accordingly, we test whether the relation between peer choice and peer valuation is mitigated for higher-ability analysts.
Effects of Analyst Incentives (External Financing)
Research shows that sell-side analysts do not always act in the best interests of investors.
Rather, analysts may be serving personal objectives, such as increasing their compensation, improving relations with management, garnering investment banking business for their brokerage firm, "hyping" the stock to garner brokerage trading volumes, and increasing the value of shares personally owned (e.g., Lin and McNichols 1998; Womack 1999, 2005; Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang 2003; Ertimur, Sunder, and Sunder 2007; Ke and Yu 2007; Barniv et al. 2009 Barniv et al. , 2010 . Prior research demonstrates that affiliated analysts (i.e., those with direct investment banking business with the firm) issue more optimistic forecasts (Dugar and Nathan 1995; Lin and McNichols 1998; Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 2000) . 6 Based on these prior findings, we predict that the relation between peer choice and peer valuation, if any, in peer selection will increase in analysts' incentives, proxied for by firms' external financing needs following Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2006) . 
Effects of Expected Firm Growth
Financial analysts appear to be especially focused on firms' growth opportunities. For example, Bradshaw (2004) shows that analysts give the highest recommendations to growth stocks. In particular, analysts recommend stocks with strong growth potential, even if such potential is already impounded into the stock price (Barniv et al. 2009 (Barniv et al. , 2010 . Consistent with these ideas, Bradshaw (2004) finds that stock recommendations are not significantly associated with buy-and-hold one-year future returns. 8 Given analysts' preoccupation with growth, we conjecture that the relation between peer selection and peer valuation is increasing in firms' expected growth opportunities.
Research Design
Using a unique hand-collected data set, we first observe and describe which peers are used by analysts in their research reports. Using a probit specification, we then consider how analysts choose peer firms.
In Equation 1, PeerChoice ijk is an indicator variable that equals one if analyst k's report on firm i contains peer j in determining valuation, and equals zero otherwise. The treatment sample (i.e., PeerChoice = 1) for this test includes peers actually chosen by analysts in their reports. To estimate the model, we require a sample of peers not chosen by analysts. To provide observations in which PeerChoice = 0, we randomly match each selected peer j with a firm from the universe of companies in the same GIC 2-digit industry as the firm i, with available data, and not chosen by the analyst in the report. Thus we have an equal number of selected and nonselected peers in the sample, for each firm i. We limit the sample of peers chosen and not chosen by analysts to those in the same GIC 2-digit industry because for the analysts' reports in our sample, we find that 92% of the peer firms chosen by analysts are from the same 2-digit GIC industry. Similar to Boni and Womack (2006) , we note that GIC industry definitions seem to better represent analyst choices than SIC classifications as only 68% of peers are from the same 2-digit SIC industry.
Economic Factor is a set of M variables expected to explain the choice of peers within a similar industry. 9 This set designates factors not associated with any bias by the analyst. These factors include standard economic factors, such as similar size and industry, on which firms are often matched by academic researchers (e.g., Barber and Lyon 1996) , as well as several other potential dimensions. From a practitioner perspective for example, Koller, Goedhart, and Wessels (2005) recommend choosing peers based on similarity in risk, growth, and after-tax return on capital. It is an empirical question as to which economic factors better explain peers actually used in practice.
The following are the economic factors used in our tests. Based on a review of leading financial analysis texts and prior academic research, we start with similarity in revenues (i.e., size), revenue growth, leverage, asset turnover, profit margin, stock price volatility, trading volume turnover, and stock return. LogSales is the natural logarithm of total revenues in year t-1.
SalesGrowth is year t-1 revenues less year t-2 revenues scaled by year t-2 revenues. Leverage is total long-term debt divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. AssetTurnover is total revenues divided by total assets in year t-1. ProfitMargin is income before extraordinary items divided by 9 All variables used in the study are defined in Appendix A.
total revenues in year t-1. Volatility is the standard deviation in monthly stock returns during the four years ending in year t-1. Turnover is the volume of shares traded divided by shares outstanding in year t-1. Return is the stock return during year t-1.
To measure the "similarity" between firms and their potential peers, we take the absolute value of the difference between firm i's and peer j's respective variables at time t-1 and multiply the difference by -1. We then add the prefix Sim_ to the variable. For example, Sim_LogSales is our proxy for similar size and equals the absolute value of the difference between the logarithm of total revenues for firm i and the logarithm of total revenues for peer j, both measured at the end of fiscal year t-1. We multiply the variable by -1 so that greater values indicate more similarity.
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Note that we focus on the similarity in accounting return components (i.e., sales, sales growth, leverage, asset turnover, and profit margin) between firms to capture closeness in firm fundamentals. At the same time, we extend our analysis to stock-based components including volatility, turnover, volume, and returns. This allows our analysis to capture similarities in firm fundamentals as well as in a firm's information and trading environments. In addition, because stock returns reflect both realized and anticipated performance, tests that encompass stockrelated components might capture similarities in longer-term economic performance. These measures can also capture similarity in risk.
Our economic factors further include comparability in earnings and returns as employed by De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011) and Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler (2003) . ComparabilityEarn is the R 2 from a regression of firm i's quarterly earnings on the quarterly earnings of firm j during the 16 quarters ending in year t-1. ComparabilityRet is the R 2 from a regression of firm i's monthly returns on the monthly returns of firm j during the four years ending in year t-1. These measures are defined so that greater values indicate more comparability. The intuition underlying these measures is as follows. Changes in input prices or customer demand for firms with similar business models should translate into similar changes in accounting and economic profitability, which in turn translates into stock returns and earnings performance covarying over time for similar peers.
Last, we include variables that indicate whether the peers and firms are in the same industry using more finely partitioned industry categories. 11 SameGIC3digit is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is in the same 3-digit GIC code as the potential peer, and zero otherwise. SameGIC5digit is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is in the same 5-digit GIC code as the potential peer, and zero otherwise.
For each of the above economic factors, a positive association between a potential peer j's similarity to firm i and the probability that the company (j) is chosen as a peer is consistent with analysts using economic factors to guide peer selection, ceteris paribus.
We next consider the effect of peers' valuation multiples on analysts' choice of peers. We augment the Equation 1 specification with peers' valuation multiple.
Multiple Peer is a peer's valuation multiple and is measured in the reciprocal, that is with enterprise valuation or price in its denominator so as to reduce the impact of extreme values (Liu, Nissim, and Thomas 2002; De Franco, Gavious, Jin, and Richardson 2011) . We consider the following four widely used valuation multiples: earnings to price (E/P), book to price (B/P), sales to enterprise value (S/EV), and EBITDA to enterprise value (EBITDA/EV). A negative association between a potential peer's valuation multiple and the probability that the company is chosen as a peer, after controlling for the economic factors, is consistent with peers being chosen in an optimistically-biased manner.
Next, we test whether peer selection bias varies with the three conditioning factors using the following model: We measure II-Rank as an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the analyst is II-ranked in a given year, and zero otherwise. ExtFin is a continuous measure of external financing. We follow Bradshaw et al. (2006) in defining ExtFin as the change in both equity and debt financing. Finally, we proxy for the firm's expected growth (ExpGrowth) by its market-tobook ratio. To be precise, we use the book-to-market ratio multiplied by minus one. (We use book-to-market instead of market-to-book as the latter has more extreme observations.)
Data, Sample Selection, and Descriptive Statistics
The peers that an analyst uses in her analysis are not available in a machine-readable form in existing databases. We use a hand-collected sample of analysts' reports from Thomson
Investext and manually extract peer information from the reports. We collect a sample of analyst reports from 2005 and 2008. 12 The high cost of collecting the peer information limits our analysis to two years of data. For examples of peer valuations used in sell-side equity analysts' research reports, we direct the reader to Appendix B.
The reports are chosen as follows. We begin with all firms (i.e., firm i's) in our sample with data available on Compustat and CRSP. For a randomly-selected subset of these firms, we search Investext to find up to three reports per firm i, each written by a different analyst and each mentioning the word "comparable" or "peer" firms (i.e., potential peer j's) in the report. Peer information is manually collected from the analysts' reports. We read through the analyst report to ensure that the peer companies listed are the ones used for benchmarking purposes. This is important because peers can also be used in other contexts, such as in written discussions of firm i's industry dynamics. We find that about 98% of the analyst reports that we identify explicitly use peers to benchmark valuation. We collect financial information from CRSP and Compustat for each of the peer j firms mentioned in the analysts' reports. As discussed below, we also collect information for a sample of non-selected peers within the same industry. The sample is further reduced by the requirement of financial variables for the peer j firms, plus the random matching process we employ. The final sample is 1,575 report-year observations (for 1,339
unique firms) and 8,968 peers (3,090 unique peers). To mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. We compare the characteristics of firms covered by analyst reports, and firms chosen by analysts as peers in their reports. Table 1 , Panel B provides these descriptive statistics. We find that the firms covered in analyst reports and those chosen as peers in the analyst reports, are similar in sales growth, leverage, and asset turnover.
Test Results
This section describes the results of our main tests. The first subsection provides analyses of economic factors in explaining peer choice, followed by an analysis of the relation between peer selection and peer valuation multiples. We next report conditional analyses in which we consider the effects of analyst ability, analyst incentives, and expected firm growth. We further provide some preliminary evidence on the relation between optimistic biases in peer choice and stock recommendations. Finally, we report the results of whether our prediction model is useful in forecasting future valuation multiples. Reported standard errors are clustered at the firm level because the estimation of Equations 1 through 3 could suffer from time-series dependence. The first column of Table 2 Panel A presents results using only the economic factors (i.e.,
Equation 1) and provides support for the assertion that analysts' peer selection captures similarity in firm characteristics. In particular, analysts are more likely to choose companies as peers if the company is similar in size, leverage, asset turnover, and share turnover, as well as when the potential peer is of the same industry (using both three-and five-digit GIC codes). For example, the coefficient on Sim_LogSales is 0.175 and significantly different than zero. In addition, the coefficients on both the earnings and returns comparability measures are positive and statistically significant. The tests provide some weaker evidence that sales growth, return volatility, and recent returns matter (i.e., the two-sided p-values are 0.14, 0.15, and 0.11, respectively). We do not find evidence that profit margin differences are important to peer selection. Overall, we conclude that analysts select peer firms that are similar along several important economic dimensions, addressing our first research question regarding how peers are selected in practice.
Tests of Peer Valuation and Peer Selection
We next test the effects of peer valuation multiples on peer selection. The second through fifth columns of SimSales, there is an approximate 24 to 29% change in the probability that firm j is chosen as a peer.
Robustness Tests
We provide several robustness tests in Panel B of Table 2 . For brevity we only tabulate the results for Multiple Peer -E/P test (the most widely used multiple in practice) but the inferences for the other valuation multiples are similarly unaffected in these sensitivity analyses.
In Column 1, we use a different sampling approach. We re-estimate our tests using all firms from the same 2-digit GIC industry as peers, either analyst chosen or not chosen. This alternative approach yields a much larger sample of 714,698 observations. The inference with respect to the peer E/P multiple is unaltered. In this much larger sample, all the economic factors except
Sim_Volatility and Sim_Return have the predicted sign and are statistically significant at the two percent level or better.
In Column 2, we consider the possibility that analyst k is more likely to choose company j as a peer for firm i when the analyst also formally provides research coverage of company j.
We re-estimate the test to control for this possibility by including in our regressions a variable (Follow) that indicates whether the analyst also covers company j. We find that analyst coverage of a company increases the probability that it will be used as a peer. More importantly, the inference with respect to the peer E/P multiple is unaltered.
In Column 3, we examine the effect of analyst k potentially being more likely to choose company j as a peer for firm i when company j is larger and more well known. We re-estimate the test to control for this possibility by including in our regressions the size of firm j (jSales).
We find that the size of a company increases the probability that it will be used as a peer. More importantly, the inference with respect to the peer E/P multiple is unaltered.
Finally, in Column 4, we control for the relative valuation multiple of firm j. We reestimate the test by including in our regressions the negative of the absolute value of the difference between the valuation multiples of firm i and firm j (Sim_E/P). We find that analysts are more likely to choose firms that are similar in valuation multiple. Controlling for the relative valuation of firm j, we continue to find that analysts choose peers with higher E/P multiples.
In summary, Table 2 provides evidence that analysts choose peers that are similar in performance, size, industry, and stock return performance to the firms they are being compared with. Earnings and return comparability are also key factors explaining peer choice. However, after controlling for these factors, firms with higher valuation multiples are more likely to be chosen by analysts as peers. These are new findings in the literature. Panel B tabulates the results relating to analyst incentives, operationalized as the firm's external financing needs. Across all four models, the interaction is negative as predicted. The interaction terms are statistically significant except for Multiple Peer -E/P. In other words, analysts are more likely to pick peer firms with high valuations when they or their employers are more likely to benefit through new fees for services related to the raising of external financing.
Conditional Analyses: Analyst Reputation, Analyst Incentives, and Expected Firm Growth
Finally, Panel C reports the expected firm growth results. For three of the four valuation metrics, the interaction with the growth variable is negative and significant at the one percent level (whereas the interaction with Multiple Peer -EBITDA/EV is not significant). These findings indicate that analysts are more optimistic for firms that have high expected growth prospects, consistent with Bradshaw's (2004) and Barniv et al.'s (2009) conclusions that analysts are "obsessed" with growth (even if it is impounded into the current stock price).
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In addition to highlighting how the bias in peer firm selection varies systematically with fundamental analyst and firm characteristics, the conditional analyses provide further support for our primary tests. That is, we find that the optimistic bias in peer selection is most pronounced in subsamples for which we have ex ante reasons to believe that such a bias is more likely to exist. 
Some Empirical Evidence on Bias in Peer Selection and Stock Recommendations
Although the primary purpose of this study is not to "explain" prior research findings about optimism in analysts' recommendations, it is interesting to explore whether the relation between peer valuation and peer choice is stronger for analysts with Buy recommendations. If that is the case, our findings could partially explain the mechanism through which analysts To provide initial evidence on this issue, we estimate Equation (2) augmented with an interaction between buy recommendations (Buy) and the valuation multiple (as well as the main effect of Buy). Specifically, we code Buy as one for analyst reports containing buy or strong buy recommendations, and zero otherwise. 18 Results in Table 4 show that the interaction term is 16 In untabulated results, we simultaneously test for the effects of both external financing and expected growth. For E/P and B/P, we find that both results hold. For S/EV we find that the expected growth result holds but the external financing result does not, while for EBITDA/EV, we find that the external financing result holds but the expected growth result does not. 17 These contextual analyses also help rule out "alternative explanations" (beyond what our control variables pick up) for why analysts choose peer firms with high valuations. 18 In our sample, 58% of analyst reports are coded as Buy.
negative and statistically significant for Multiple Peer -B/P and Multiple Peer -E/P, which are the two most widely used valuation metrics in practice (e.g., Barker 1999; Block 1999 Block , 2010 .
There is no significant interaction effect for the other two valuation multiples. These findings provide partial support for the notion that positively skewed stock recommendations may be justified by analysts by selecting peer firms with high valuation.
Additional Analyses: The Usefulness of Peer Selection in Forecasting Future
Valuation Multiples
We know from practice and research that an important part of analysts' work is firm valuation. Given that the above findings suggest that there is an element of strategic behavior in analysts' choice of peers, it is an empirical question whether analysts' peer selections help forecast firm valuations. Thus, although our primary interest in this study is to examine how analysts choose their peers, test whether the choice is affected by relative valuation, and explore cross-sectional variations in this effect, we also test whether a peer selection model based upon how sell-side analysts choose peers in practice can add to existing models in forecasting future valuation multiples.
A widely cited study by Bhojraj and Lee (2002) develops a systematic approach to predict valuation multiples based on valuation theory. In addition to using industry valuation multiples and industry-size-matched multiples, Bhojraj and Lee produce "warranted multiples"
for each firm that are based on systematic variations in the observed multiples in cross-section over large samples. In Table 5 , we first estimate regressions highly similar to the Bhojraj and Lee results for current through two-year ahead forecasts of P/B and EV/S valuation multiples (e.g., our Column 1 is highly similar to Column 5 in their Table 5 (4) The explanatory variables in this regression are defined as in Bhojraj and Lee (see Appendix A for more details). We also estimate the analogous regression using EV/S valuation multiples.
Although our sample period is different from Bhojraj and Lee, our results are largely consistent with what they tabulate. For example, firms identified using Bhojraj and Lee's "warranted" multiples (variables with the prefix W_) have strong ability to predict current or future multiples.
We extend the Bhojraj and Lee tests by including an Analyst Predicted multiple, which is defined as follows. For each firm i with non-missing Compustat and CRSP data, we use the coefficients in Table 2 , Panel A, Column 1 to estimate a peer prediction score for all firm j's in the same GIC 2-digit industry. For each firm i, we keep the four firm j's with the highest peer prediction scores. We calculate the average multiple (P/B or EV/S in panels A and B, respectively) across these four highest-ranked firm j's and refer to this average multiple as the Analyst Predicted multiple.
More importantly, in the next column we illustrate the additional explanatory power of the Analyst Predicted multiple. In all six specifications, Analyst Predicted multiple is positive and statistically significant, consistent with the idea that the peers chosen in a manner similar to how analysts choose peers in practice help forecast future valuation multiples. 20 Overall, we conclude that our analysts' peer prediction model adds value to extant forecasting models, further validating our approach and highlighting the importance of considering how analysts choose peer firms.
In untabulated analyses, also like Bhojraj and Lee, we further examine the distribution of absolute valuation errors, defined as the absolute difference between the actual price and the price implied by the multiples used in Equation 4 as explanatory variables. These results support the above regression analysis. For example, the smallest errors are generally produced when we use the implied price from Bhojraj and Lee's "warranted" multiples and the multiple from our analyst peer prediction model.
Concluding Remarks
Although a considerable literature on sell-side analysts exists, a large amount of this research has focused on the earnings forecasting task, which perhaps is surprising given that earnings forecasts are either less important than other activities or just one of the inputs into analysts' other activities (Schipper 1991; Bradshaw 2011) . We contribute to a better understanding of analysts' work, in particular their choice of peer firms for benchmarking purposes, beyond that of well-studied analysts' tasks such as recommendations and forecasts. 20 Adding Analyst Predicted to the model increases the adjusted R 2 for the P/B tests (Panel A) between 9.6 (i.e. 2.2/22.8), and 12.2 percent. For EV/S (Panel B), the increases in explanatory power are more modest at between 4.4 and 6.7 percent.
Using a unique hand-collected data set, we observe and examine which peer companies are used by sell-side equity analysts in their research reports. We first show that analysts are more likely to choose peer firms that are similar in size, growth, leverage, asset turnover, industry classification, share price returns, volatility, and trading volume to the firm they are recommending. However, controlling for the above factors, we further find that analysts select peer companies with higher valuations than the firms they are recommending, consistent with analysts choosing peers in an optimistically biased manner.
We next investigate whether the bias in peer selection varies systematically with analyst reputation, analyst incentives, and expected firm growth. Providing further support for the above findings, we find that the bias is especially pronounced for non-II-ranked analysts, in firms with relatively greater external financing needs, and for firms with high expected growth. In addition, there is at least some indication that the previously documented positive bias in stock recommendations may be justified by analysts in selecting peer firms with high valuations.
Finally, we show that our peer prediction model helps improve upon extant models for forecasting future valuation multiples.
APPENDIX A -Variable Definitions
Analyst Predicted_
= Prefix added to either EV/S or P/B ratio. It indicates the average EV/S or P/B ratio of the four highest-ranked peers, according to our peer prediction model from Table 2 . To construct this variable, we rank all the firms each year on the basis of the W_EV/S or W_P/B in the same industry, and compute the harmonic mean of the actual EV/S or P/B for these firms.
AssetTurnover
II-Rank
= Indicator variable that equals one if the analyst is ranked an All-American analyst in year t according to Institutional Investor magazine, and equals zero otherwise IS_ = Prefix added to either EV/S or P/B. It indicates the harmonic mean of the actual EV/S or P/B ratios for the four firms from the same industry with the closest market capitalization. Industry membership is defined in terms of the two digit GIC codes.
Leverage
= Total long-term debt divided by total assets
Multiple Peer = Peer's valuation multiple and is measured in the reciprocal. It takes on one of four valuation multiples: E/P, B/P, S/EV, and, EBITDA/EV. P/B = Price per share divided by book value per share, at the end of year t-1 PeerChoice = Indicator variable that equals one if the analyst's report on firm i contains peer j in determining valuation, and equals zero otherwise. (1) the harmonic mean of the EV/S in the same industry, (2) the harmonic mean of the P/B ratio in the same industry, (3) the industry-adjusted profit margin, (4) the industry-adjusted profit margin when the adjusted profit is negative, (5) industry-adjusted analyst growth estimates, (6) book leverage (long-term debt scaled by book value of common equity), (7) return on net operating assets, (8) return on equity, and (9) R&D expenditures divided by sales. 
APPENDIX B -Excerpts from
TABLE 2 -Probit Analysis of Peer Choice
This table reports the results of estimating Probit models predicting the analyst's peer choice based on financial factors (Column 1) and the potential peer's valuation (remaining columns) in Panel A. Panel B provides robustness tests using all possible peers from the same GIC 2-digit industry (Column 1); after controlling for whether the analyst follows firm j (Column 2); after controlling for the size (i.e., sales) of firm j (Column 3); and after controlling for the similarity of firm j's valuation relative to firm i. Intercepts are included in all regressions but not tabulated for brevity. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the firm-level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix A.
Multiple Peer is:
Panel A (1) 
Panel A: Effect of analyst skill
Multiple Peer is: 
TABLE 5 -Prediction regressions
This table reports the results of estimating OLS models predicting current, one-year ahead, and two-year ahead valuation multiples using current year multiples as constructed by Bhojraj and Lee (2002) and our predicted peer valuation multiple using our model in Table 2 . In Panel A, the dependent variable is the price-to-book ratio (P/B). In Panel B, the dependent variable is the enterprise-value-to-sales ratio (EV/S). Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the firm-level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
